policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide
still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB
still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB
still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB
policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide
policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide
still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB
policy space is still 1–dimensional — what level g of per capitaexpenditure to provide
still 2 parties, trying to maximize probability of getting elected,still committing to policies gA and gB
but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ
δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B
a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is
(as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if
δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B
a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is
(as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if
but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ
a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is
(as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if
but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ
δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B
income y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if
but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ
δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B
a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is
(as in the “minimum differentiation” model),
but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ
δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B
a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is
(as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if
but now the parties differ in their popularity, measured by δ
δ > 0 means that (all) people like party B better ; the bigger isδ, the bigger the popularity advantage for party B
a voter’s utility when the public expenditure is
(as in the “minimum differentiation” model), but a person ofincome y J will vote for party A over party B if and only if
assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ]
so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value
parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices
if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ)
this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone
assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ]
so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value
parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices
if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ)
this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone
so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value
parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices
if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ)
this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone
assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ]
parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices
if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ)
this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone
assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ]
so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value
if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ)
this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone
assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ]
so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value
parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices
this popularity measure δ is the same for everyone
assumption : δ is a random variable, drawn from the uniformdistribution over [− 1 , 1 ]
so δ can take any value between − 1 and 1 , and every value
parties know what ψ is, but they don’t know the actual value ofδ when they make their policy choices
if δ is big and positive, only votes for party A are from people forwhom W J (gA) is a lot bigger than W J (gB) (for whomW J (gA) − W J (gB) > δ)
so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ
voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if
the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone
but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)
so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ
voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if
the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone
but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people
voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if
the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone
but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people
so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ
the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone
but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people
so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ
voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δ
the popularity parameter δ is the same for everyone
but there’s a second new element, an “idiosyncratic” biasamong voters (for one party or the other)which differs among people
so there are many voters of income y J ; they also vary in theirpersonal preference σiJ
voter iJ’s overall preference for party B over party A is σiJ + δso she’ll vote for party A only if
parties know about these biases ; each party knows, forexample, that 1/4 of all the voters of income y J have a bias infavour of party B of 1 or more
for each income level y J , these biases σiJ are uniformlydistributed over some interval
for each income level y J , these biases σiJ are uniformlydistributed over some interval
parties know about these biases ; each party knows, forexample, that 1/4 of all the voters of income y J have a bias infavour of party B of 1 or more
everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A
the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties :
everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A
the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties :
everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A
the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties :
the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties :
everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A
the voter of personal bias σJ is defined as the voter (of incomey J ) who is indifferent between the parties :
everyone whose bias is less than σJ votes for party A
if a fraction αJ of the voters have an income y J (and thesevoters vary in their biases), and party A gets a share 1 + σJ φJ
of those voters’ votes, then equation (2) implies that party A’soverall vote is
party A wins if this share is greater than 1 , which will happen if
party A wins if this share is greater than 1 , which will happen if
if a fraction αJ of the voters have an income y J (and thesevoters vary in their biases), and party A gets a share 1 + σJ φJ
of those voters’ votes, then equation implies that party A’soverall vote is
if a fraction αJ of the voters have an income y J (and thesevoters vary in their biases), and party A gets a share 1 + σJ φJ
of those voters’ votes, then equation implies that party A’soverall vote is
party A wins if this share is greater than 1 , which will happen if
so that equation (5) says that party A’s probability of winning is
where φ is the average value of the φJ ’s :
the probability that the popularity parameter δ is less than x is
the probability that the popularity parameter δ is less than x is
so that equation says that party A’s probability of winning is
where φ is the average value of the φJ ’s :
party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression (7)
taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival
choose a policy gA to maximize expression (7)
taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival
party A wants to maximize its chance of winning
taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival
party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression
party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression
taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival
party A wants to maximize its chance of winning ; so it shouldchoose a policy gA to maximize expression
taking as given the policy gB chosen by its rival
party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gBso that it chooses gB so as to maximize
as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium
as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium
party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gB
as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium
party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gBso that it chooses gB so as to maximize
party B wants to maximize its own chance of winning, givenparty A’s policy gBso that it chooses gB so as to maximize
as in the simple (no uncertainty) Hotelling–Black–Downsmodel, parties here choose the same policies in equilibrium
the policy each party chooses — the solution to (8) [or (10)]
maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests
conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ
high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups
maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests
conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ
high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups
the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or
conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ
high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups
the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or
maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests
conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ
high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups
the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or
maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests
means “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ
high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups
the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or
maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests
conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj —
high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups
the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or
maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests
conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ
the policy each party chooses — the solution to [or
maximizes a weighted sum of different groups’ interests
conclusion : more weight on groups with high φj — whichmeans “less–spread–out” distribution of the indiosyncraticcharacteristic σiJ
high φJ means more responsive to small changes in policy,which means politicians pay more attention to such groups

'Viagra and Jack Daniels' culture is creating a crisis of masculinity for British men, claims Labour's Diane Abbott Generation of men in the grip of crisis, shadow health minister says Drink and porn fuel anxiety about sexual performance and masculinity Lack of jobs means young men live with parents in 'extended adolescence' By Matta Chorley,Mail online Political Editor

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